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Abstract:

The most essential step in adjusting and improving the childbearing policy,
the universal two-child policy will produce far-reaching impacts on the
future development of China’s population. With its implementation, the
country’s total population will peak later, the underage population and
its proportion will increase substantially, the working-age population will
experience a slower decline, and the aging of China’s population will be
eased. However, the drop in the proportion of working-age people over the
last 15 years has expedited the reduction of the demographic dividend, the
elderly population will remain unaffected over the next 60 years, the aging of
the population will continue to deepen, and at the same time, the increased
child dependency burden will expand the overall dependency ratio.
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C

hina’s population development is highly complicated for two reasons: First,
the number of people affected is enormous; a minor structural change is
likely to morph into a major problem.Second, China has a childbearing policy with
Chinese characteristics. For a long time, the adjustment and improvement of the
childbearing policy has drawn the attention of the whole society, even the world.
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It is especially so after the launch of the two-child
policy for couples where either the husband or the
wife is from a single-child family. The direction
China's childbearing policy would take has become
a hot topic and widely discussed for some time.
The phenomenon indicated the importance people
give to the childbearing policy’s impact on future
population development. The restricted two-child
policy was a preface to the new round of adjustment
and improvement, whereas the universal two-child
policy is the central issue.The universal two-child
policy brings about new opportunities, but also
produces new challenges.

1. Adjusting and Perfecting the Childbearing Policy: From the Twochild Policy for Couples where
Either the Husband or the Wife
Is from a Single-child Family to
the Universal Two-child Policy
Over a relatively long period following the
institution of family planning as a basic national
policy, the childbearing policy remained stable
overall, and was only fine-tuned locally. Since
the Party’s 18th national congress, efforts have
beenstrengthenedand the pace has picked up in
carrying out a new round of adjustments and
improvements: The Third Plenary of the Standing
Committee of the 18th Central Committee of the
Party included the two-child policy for couples
where either the husband or the wife is from a
single-child family in the major initiatives to deepen
comprehensive reform and the Fifth Plenary of the
Standing Committee listed the universal two-child
policy as among the strategic tasks of economic and
social development during the “13th Five-year Plan”.
However, whether it be local fine-tuning, or greater
and faster adjustment and improvement on a national
scale, the fundamental purpose is to co-ordinate

population size and structure and promote longterm, balanced population development. To adjust
and improve the childbearing policy, we must first
focus on characteristics of changes in population
size and structure.
During the 1970s when the family planning
policy featuring later birth, longer birth intervals
and fewer births was established and gradually
implemented, the population growth rate had
significantly decreased for the first time since 1949.
The annual net increase in population growth was
reduced from 23.21 million in 1970 to 12.83 million
in 1979 and the natural population growth rate was
reduced correspondingly from about 2.6% to about
1.2%. In the 1990s, under the combined influence
of the family planning policy and the economic
and social development, the population growth rate
declined significantly again. The annual net increase
in population growth decreased from 16.29 million
in 1990 to 10.25 million in 1999, with the natural
population growth rate correspondingly dropping
from about 1.4% to about 0.8%. In the 21st century,
since the fertility rate basically stabilized at this low
level, the population growth rate continued to slow,
and the annual net increase of population decreased
from nearly 9 million to 6.4 million at its lowest point,
with the natural population growth rate dropping from
about 0.7% to 0.48% at the lowest point. In 2010 and
after, population growth entered the new normal with
an annual net increase of no more than 6.7 million
and a natural growth rate stabilizing at about 0.5%
(the lowest level since the 1960s). In this process, the
pressure on population size had been eased, but the
problems with the population structure have become
increasingly pronounced. The aging of population
(at the beginn-ing of the 21st century, the proportion
of the elderly population aged 60 and over surpassed
the “threshold level” marking the entry into an aging
society) and the imbalance in the gender structure
(in the first 10 years of the 21st century, the gender
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ratio at birth topped 120, its highest level since 1949)
plagued population development to a great extent, and
thus had a profound impact on sustained economic
growth and stable social development. To implement
more relaxed, specific fertility policies under the
framework of the basic national policy of family
planning, and to optimize the future population
structure (to slow the aging of the population and help
reverse the gender imbalance), while controlling the
size of the population to some extent, are the principal
bases and policy objectives for the Party’s decision to
intensify and accelerate the speed of adjustment and
improvement since the 18th Party Congress.
To change from the two-child policy for couples
where either the husband or the wife is from a
single-child family to the universal two-child policy
is a path to follow in adjusting and improving the
childbearing policy, and one that suits China’s
national conditions and reflects the unity between a
clear objective and a gradual process. As a pilot to
the universal two-child policy and transition link in
the childbearing policy adjustment, the two-child
policy for couples where either the husband or the
wife is from a single-child family can release part
of the accumulated fertility potential in advance and
achieve the policy effect of a forward staggering baby
boom (the childbirths under the restricted two-child
policy peak in 2016 and 2017, while the childbirths
under the universal two-child policy peak in 2018
and 2019). Moreover, it can help decision makers
draw practical experience to deal with concentrated
childbirths, create buffer conditions to change the
mode of work, and win over the time needed for
constructing relevant public facilities thereby laying
a solid groundwork for the steadier, more orderly
landing of the universal two-child policy that has
a larger target population and accumulates greater

childbirth potential. The restricted two-child policy
has a target population of about 11 million, and the
total of potential childbirths is projected to be over
6 million.[1] Assume that the target population's
choices of having a second child are distributed
evenly over five years, then during the two years
from the adoption of the restricted two-child policy
to the implementation of the universal two-child
policy, the potential of about 2.5 million childbirths
will be released ahead of schedule, which will
alleviate the percussion of the shock in the childbirth
rate following the launch of the universal two-child
policy. Since January 2014 when the restricted twochild policy was adopted in all provinces, it started
to deliver results. Either from the perspective of the
amount of second-child applications① or the number
of hospital deliveries[2] we can see the restricted twochild policy has increased childbirths, and although
it put extra pressure on resources and services
(especially in urban areas), the pressure is still in the
manageable range. Since the restricted two-child
policy has tested the social environment and created
buffers, the timing of the implementation of the
universal two-child policy can be more mature, and
the conditions will also be more practicable.
The restrictive two-child policy must be
followed by the universal two-child policy as the
established course for the new round of adjustments
and improvements to the childbearing policy. The
universal two-child policy signals a fundamental
shift in China’s childbearing policy and is invested
with new connotations of the times. First, the
implementation of the policy reflects the change from
a strict childbearing policy to a relatively relaxed
one. Before the new round of adjustments and
improvements, the single-child policy was adopted
in urban areas while the “one and a half child” policy

① According to the tabulate data released by the National Health and Family Planning Commission, over 1.45 million couples where either the husband or the
wife comes from a single-child family applied for childbirth around the nation as of May 2015.
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(if the first child is a boy, the couple cannot have
additional children but if the first child is a girl, they
can have another child four or five years later) was
mainly pursued in rural areas. The national policy
fertility rate was only 1.47[3]as a considerable number
of people of childbearing age were restricted to only
one child. Although the restrictive two-child policy
had been successively adopted, it mainly covered
young couples, and thus had a limited influence
during theperiod it was in effect. The universal twochild policy, however, will affect a larger population.
Most people of childbearing age in urban areas
and nearly half of the people of childbearing age
in rural areas may be eligible to give birth to a
second child in the future. Second, the introduction
of the universal two-child policy reflects the shift
from group differentiation to universal unity in
the childbearing policy. Before the new round of
adjustments and improvements, China’s childbearing
policy not only has a rural-urban divide, but also
differed between different regions and ethnic groups.
For example, in rural areas of Hainan, Yunnan,
Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang and Tibet, the universal
two-child policy has long been in place, while the
one-child policy has been pursued in the rural areas
of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Sichuan
and Chongqing. Therefore, the universal two-child
policy basically eliminates the childbearing policy
differences between urban and rural areas and among
different regions, lifts the childbearing policy out
of a fragmentary era, and contributes to achieving
fairness among groups and unity within the country.
In addition, its implementation may also promote
the practical transition from being control-oriented
to being service-oriented. As the limits are scraped,
the boundaries of different groups are blurred, and
the tasks to control are lightened, the administrative
efforts can be focused on providing service. A huge
change within the framework of the basic national
policy of family planning, the universal two-child

policy will significantly affect the future development
of the population, and hence have a profound impact
on the economic and social operation.
In predicting the impact of the universal twochild policy on the future development of China’s
population, the emphasis should be given to its
impact on the future trend of China’s childbearing,
and what is most important is to project the overall
fertility level under the policy. Adopting the backinference method by groups of people, the study
calculates the total fertility rate during the period
of childbearing momentum reduction, and, on
that basis, predicts the total fertility rate after the
momentum is reduced.
First, the new round of policy adjustments
and improvements carries with it the childbearing
momentum accumulated over the last two or three
decades. Therestricted two-child policy reduced part
of the momentum, but the childbirth concentration
is expected to raise the fertility level due to the
enormous target population of the universal twochild policy. Relying on data from the 2014 national
population change sampling survey, by examining
the size of the target population of the universal twochild policy (including two main links: deducting
the number of women of childbearing age according
to the current fertility policy and forecasting
the fertility rate at the policy-change year based
on the current fertility rate), and analyzing the
proportional distribution of second childbirth of the
target population, we can estimate the childbirth
concentration under the universal two-child policy
(Integrate the size of the target population and the
proportional distribution of its second childbirth
with childbearing age to get the overall childbirth
concentration size, and then combine them with the
time of the second childbirth of the target population
to calculate the annual concentration). Then, we can
back-infer the fertility level under the universal twochild policy, and based on that predict the indexes of
103
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future population changes. The method of classifying
groups and elements directly produces data that are
reliable, and logically clear without too much indirect
estimation, thereby ensuring high quality. The
results show that it will take roughly five years for
the childbirth concentration under the universal twochild policy to be released, and the total fertility rate
is expected to reach the replacement level (around 2.1),
and ultimately fall to about 1.8.
Second, after the accumulated childbirth
potentials of the universal two-child policy are
unleashed, the fertility level will fall. But due to
the expansion of the policy space, the total fertility
rate is expected to be slightly higher than before the
implementation of the policy (around 1.65), roughly
between 1.70 and 1.75. With the gradual economic
and social development, the fertility level will drop
further on this basis. But the childbearing policy
adjustment and improvement does not end with
the universal two-child policy. By 2050, a more
relaxed, and even encouraging childbearing policy
is bound to be implemented. By the middle of the
21st century, the total fertility rate is expected to be
stabilized at around 1.7.
This study aims to predict the future population
development trends under the universal two-child
policy. Considering both the restricted two-child policy
and the universal two-child policy are integral parts of
the new round of childbearing policy adjustments and
improvements, the following will compare them with
the original strictly followed childbearing policy and
discuss the universal two-child policy’s influence on
China’s population after 2015.

two-child policy. From the perspective of the total
population’s size, the policy will raise the population
peak, while delaying the population’s turning point.
It is especially so with the era of negative growth
in population, where the policy’s impacts become
even more poignant. The projections (see Fig. 1)
show that, if the previous strict childbearing policy
remains unchanged, the inertial growth of the total
population will continue,reaching its peak of about
1.415 billion by 2025. The year 2025 marks the
beginning of the era of negative population growth.
Thereafter, the total population will reduce at an
increasingly high rate. By the mid-21st century,
the average annual reduction in population will
approximate 10 million, and the total population
will be reduced to less than 1.3 billion (about 1.285
billion by 2050). Under the universal two-child
policy, the total population will peak around the year
2028, at about 1.45 billion, 35 million more than if
the original strict policy remains unchanged. The era
of negative population growth will thus be delayed
by three years. After that, the decline in the total
population will be relatively flat. By the mid-21st
century, the total population will basically remain at
more than 1.4 billion (in 2050, about 1.383 billion,
100 million more than if the original strict policy is
kept unchanged). At that time, the average annual
reduction in population will be about 6million. The

2. Total Population Size and Structure:
The Delayed Turning Point and
Irreversible Aging of the Population
The development trend of China’s population
will be profoundly influenced by the universal
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Figure 2 Comparison of Population Pyramids
under Different Childbearing Polices(2030&2050)

rapid negative growth will be eased.
The impacts of the universal two-child policy
are manifested not only in population size, but in
population structure as well. For the next four or five
decades, China’s population will assume an overall
trend of rapid aging. The reflection of this trend in
the population pyramid will be the rapid expansion
of the pyramid's top and the corresponding decrease
of its bottom and middle parts. Fig. 2 includes the
population pyramids in 2030 and 2050, which
can be regarded as a microcosm of this process.
If the original strict childbearing policy remains
unchanged, China willenter the two periods,
one where the proportion of the aged population
increases at a faster pace and the other where the
underage population decreases rapidly, as the
population cohorts resulting from the second baby
boom (born in the 1960s and early 1970s) and the
third baby boom (born in the 1980s) successively
become older (in Fig. 2, the population pyramid
of 2030 basically reflects the population cohort
from the second baby boom the senior age group
causing obvious swelling of the top. The population
pyramid of 2050 basically reflects the population
cohort from the third baby boom entering the senior
age group, causing an even more obvious swelling

of the top). By the mid-21st century, the middle
and bottom parts of the population pyramid will
have shrunk. The introduction of the universal
two-child policy can alleviate this contraction.
Fig. 2 reflects the results of the reduction in the
accumulated childbearing potentials. China will
experience a birth peak over a relatively short period
which is conducive to stabilizing the proportions
of the working-age population and the underage
population. Nevertheless, the two-child policy only
somewhat slows the aging of the population and is
unable to put a stop to it. Under the general trend of
the population’s aging, the effects of the universal
two-child policy are of limited significance.

3. Underage Population: Concentrated Childbirths Change Its Tendency
The underage population group is highly
sensitive to adjustments in childbearing policies
and both the size and proportion of this group will
undergo changes immediately after the childbearing
policy is adjusted. Under different childbearing
policies, changes in the underage population’s
size and proportion will manifest distinct trends.
Under the universal two-child policy, the size
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and proportion will first rise, then decline before
experiencing a small margin increase for the next
40-odd years, while if the original strict policy
remains unchanged, the size and proportion will be
in continuous decline over the same period.
After the universal two-child policy goes
into effect, the number of childbirths will besubstantially increased. Inf luenced by this, the
underage population will also grow substantially
and experience a short-period peak. Forecasts
(see Figure 3) show that the underage population
will peak around 2022, at about 261 million.
After the childbirth concentration following the
implementation of the universal two-child policy, the
underage population will experience a decline for
around twenty years. During this period, its size will
drop below 200 million in 2037, and will reach its
lowest point of 194 million around 2041. From then
on as this group enters childbearing age, there will
be a small peak in the population leading to another
small increase in the size of the underage population.
The uplift will bring the underage population back
to above 200 million around 2047, and send it to 203
million in 2050.
Forecasts show that if the original policy
remains unchanged, the underage population could
drop below 200 million as early as 2031, and fall
to 155 million by the mid-21st century. Without

the addition of a newborn population produced by
the adjusted and improved childbearing policy, the
underage population under the original policy will
be consistently smaller than that under the universal
two-child policy. In the first half of the 21st century,
when their difference reaches its maximum, the
former will be 48 million less than the latter.
Forecasts (see Figure 4) show that the underage
population’s proportion will peak at about 18.2%
around the year 2020 after which the proportion
will be on a downward trajectory—it will fall
below 15% around the year 2034, and fall to 13.6%
around the year 2040. After that, the proportion will
experience a slight rebound, but will only climb to
14.7% in 2050.
Judging from the above, we can conclude that
the adjustments and improvements of the childbearing policy will give China an underage population
that is larger in size and accounts for a higher
proportion, thereby making the age structure of the
total population younger. The new-born population
resulting from the adjustments and improvements
will generate a large demand for all kinds of maternal
and child services and products in the short term,
which is both an excellent opportunity and a great
challenge for the maternal and child services market.
Meanwhile, the adding of new births will result in
a rising underage population hence a substantial

Figure 3 Change Tendency of the Underage Population
Under Different Childbearing Policies(2015~2050)

Figure 4 Change Tendency of the Underage Population's
Proportions Under Different Childbearing Policies(2015~2050)

106

│当代社会科学│第 2 期│

increase in the children dependency burden and cost
to the whole society. Specifically, preparations in
terms of child education infrastructure development
and medical services supply should be made as
soon as possible. However, in the long run, the
larger underage population resulting from the policy
adjustments and improvements will be transformed
into a greater working-age population, which will
help supplement the human resources for “old-age
care” and “child nurturing.”

4. Working-age Population: Can a
New “Demographic Dividend” Be
Created?
The impact of the universal two-child policy
on the working-age population, people aged from
15 to59, will be manifested in the changes in the
proportion of this group before the 2030s, and in
the changes in the group’s size after the 2030s.
However, the size and proportion of the working-age
population will be unchanged in the following three
aspects before the mid-21st century; the downward
trend of its size and proportion will not change
significantly, the evolution trajectory of its size
before the 2030s will experience no change (which
means the increase of the working-age population
resulting from the universal two-child policy will
only be achieved over a long term) and the trajectory
after the 2030s will hardly change (which means that
the raise of the proportion of the population group
resulting from the universal two-child policy will
only have a limited effect).
4.1 The decline in the size of the working-age
population will slow
The decline in the size of China’s workingage population began in 2012 (its peak being about
940 million[4]). For the subsequent decade, the size
of China’s working-age population will decline

at a relatively small and stable rate. According to
forecasts, by the end of the “13th Five-year Plan”,
the working-age population will only be 20 million
less than its peak. But as its size falls below 900
million (around 2024), its rapid decrease will be
particularly salient during the middle and late 2020s.
The forecasts (see Figure 5) show that during the
2026~2030 period the working-age population will
decrease by about one percent per year with an
average annual reduction of about 8.7 million. By
2030, it will fall below 850 million, about 90 million
less than the peak.
If the original strict childbearing policy remains
unchanged, this trend of rapid decrease will continue.
Based on the forecasts, after the slight slowdown in
the rate of reduction in the 2030s (the rate is still over
0.7 percentage point per year, with an average annual
reduction of nearly 7 million), a steeper reduction
rate of about two percent annually will appear in
the 2040s, an average annual reduction of over 11
million. The working-age population will fall below
800 million around 2036, below 700 million around
2048, and about 660 million by the mid-21st century.
The universal two-child policy by contrast
will slow the rapid decrease in the workingage population after 2030, especially during the
2032~2036 period. Because the new-born population
under this policy will enter working age during

Figure 5 Change Tendency of the Working-age Population's
Sizes Under Different Childbearing Policies(2015~2050)
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this period, the rapid decrease of the working-age
population will be discernibly curbed. The forecast
results show that if the universal two-child policy
is implemented, the losses in the working-age
population will be reduced to 0.3 to 0.4 percent from
the 0.9 to 1.0 percent projected under the original
strict policy. The average annual reduction being
less than 3 million under the universal two-child
policy rather than the 7.4 million projected if the
original strict policy remains unchanged. Thereafter,
influenced by the adjustments and improvements
in the childbearing policy, the rapid decrease in the
working-age population will also slow to a rate of
about 0.2 percentage points less than if the original
strict policy remains unchanged.The size of the
working-age population will fall below 800 million
around 2042, and decline to around 710 million
by the mid-21st century. Seen this way, the future
medium and long term working-age population
will highlight the effects of the universal two-child
policy.By 2050 the working-age population under
the universal two-child policy will be about 50
million more than it would be under the original
strict policy. Against the background where the
labor-intensive industries will continue to occupy
an important position in China’s economy and the
expanding aging of the population will produce
enormous pressure on old-age care, it is of prominent
significance for stabilizing the economic growth
prospects and increasing the elderly supporting
capacity to have these extra 50 million workers.
4.2 The “demographic dividend” will decrease at a faster rate over the next 15 years.
At present, the working-age population account
for about 68% of the total population. This number
will be reduced to about halfover the next four or
five decades (see Figure 6).[5] If the original strict
policy remains unchanged, the decline in the
working-age population will be relatively small
108

and smooth during two periods, before 2020 and
between 2034 and 2044 (the annual reduction rate
being no more than 0.4 percent). But the decline
will be sharper between 2020 and 2033 and in the
middle and late 2040s (the annual reduction rate
being above 0.4 percent), and the proportion of the
working-age population will fall below 60%.
In terms of the implementation effects of the
universal two-child policy, the proportion of the
working-age population will remain lower than that
under the original strict policy before 2032. The
proportion’s decrease, in large part,will be due to the
new-born population resulting from the universal
two-child policy being included in the underage
population, increasing the proportion of the underage
population and thus depressing the proportions of
the working-age and elderly population. Because
the elderly population is significantly smaller than
the working-age population, the decrease in the
former resulting from the universal two-child policy
during this period will be significantly less than that
in the latter. Therefore, increase in the proportion
of the underage population will mainly depress
the proportion of the working-age population, and
the elderly population will hardly change over
this period. Under the universal two-child policy,
the proportion of the working-age population will
fall below 60% in 2026, 4 years earlier than if the

Figure 6 Change Tendency of the Working-age Population's
Proportions Under Different Childbearing Policies(2015~2050)
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original strict policy remains unchanged.
The proportion of the working-age population
can be viewed as an important measure of the
“demographic dividend.” “Demographic dividend”
in its traditional sense refers in general to a sound
population age structure that helps boost economic
growth. It is generally believed that, when this
proportion is large and the proportions of the
elderly and the underage population are relatively
small (commonly known as the “bulged middle
and shrunk base and top”), economic growth
can be supported with an abundant labor force,
strong savings and, etc.; it hence can be seen as a
“demographic dividend”. Thus, an increase in the
proportion of the working-age population signifies
a demographic dividend accumulation to some
extent, and its decline means the abatement of
the “demographic dividend”. Over the 15 years
following the introduction of the universal two-child
policy, the “demographic dividend” will accelerate
its reduction as the proportion of the working-age
population declines.
From 2032 onwards, the new-born population
resulting from the universal two-child policy will
gradually move into working age, moderating
the decline in the proportion of the working-age
population. After 2037, the change in the proportion
will basically be the same as that under the original
relatively strict policy. Since the universal twochild policy apparently adds to the working-age
population, how come the policy does not effectively
raise the proportion? Suppose P represents the
total population of a year during this period, L
represents the working-age population if the original
strict policy remains unchanged, c is the new-born
population added to the year under the universal
two-child policy, and l is the increase in the workingage population under the two-child policy. For the
purpose of simplicity, assume that the ratio between
P and L is n (P = nL) and the ratio between c and l is

t (c =tl). Thus, in the year if the original strict policy
remains unchanged, the proportion of the workingage population will be 1/n, and under the universal
two-child policy, the proportion will be (L + l) / (nL
+ tl + l); the difference between the two is (L + l) / (nL
+ tl + l) － 1 / n = (nl－tl－l) / [n (nL+tl+ l)]. Whether
the proportion of the working-age population under
the universal two-child policy will be larger than
that if the original strict policy remains unchanged
depends on whether n－t－1 is greater than 0, or
whether n is greater than t + 1. The forecasts show
that the increase in the working-age population for
every year between 2037 and 2050 is roughly equal
to the newly added underage population; therefore,
t≈1, and t + 1≈2. But look at the proportion of the
working-age population for every year if the original
strict policy remains unchanged, n approximates
2 (the working-age population’s proportion 1 / n
inclines towards half). Hence, the proportion of
the working-age population under the universal
two-child policy is roughly equal to that under the
original strict policy. When 1 / n< 1 / (t + 1) ≈ 1/2
(or the proportion of the working-age population
under the original strict policy is less than half),
the working-age population’s proportion under the
universal two-child policy can surpass that under the
original strict policy. But this precondition is unlikely
to materialize by the mid-21st century.Although the
universal two-child policy can increase the size of
the working-age population in the medium and long
term, the proportion of this population group will
hardly be raised. Based on the above, it is unlikely
that the universal two-child policy could create a
new “demographic dividend,” at least by 2050.

5. Aging of the Population: the
Trend Is Delayed while the
Elderly Population Swells
With the sustained and rapid economic and
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social development, the aging of the population
has always been one of the most typical features
of the population’s development. In light of the
international population change patterns, population’s aging is irreversible. This means that for the
foreseeable future, whether the childbearing policy is
adjusted will not fundamentally change the general
trend of a continuously swelling elderly population.
But compared with the original strict policy, the
universal two-child policy will reduce the level of
the population’s aging to a degree, slow down the
aging, and thus delay the overall aging trend.
5.1 The elderly population’s size will remain
unaffected for the next 60 years
The childbearing policy’s adjustment and
improvement will have a lagging impact on the
elderly population, elders aged 60 and over. The newborn population resulting from the policy adjustment
and improvement will enter the old age after 60
years, thus affecting the amount of the elderly
population. Therefore, the policy adjustment and
improvement will not affect the elderly population’s
size for 60 years. Be it under the original strict
policy, or the universal two-child policy, the elderly
population will exceed, in sequence, 300 million
around 2025, 400 million around 2034, and climb
to 470 million by the mid-21st century (see Figure
7). The whole society’s pension funds expenditure,
security system design, supporting infrastructure
building and service system construction must be
based on the overall size of the elderly population.
The reasons why the old-age care confronts
enormous challenges and is in a serious situation are:
There will be an extremely huge elderly population
in China in the near future; and the childbearing
policy’s adjustment will not effect any change to
the elderly population’s size over the next 60 years.
It is unrealistic to look to the policy adjustment and
improvement for alleviating the size pressure of
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Figure 7 Change Tendency of the Elderly Population's
Sizes Under Different Childbearing Policies(2015~2050)

the elderly population. It is required that the social
security system and the elderly care service system
be improved as soon as possible to cope with the
huge elderly population size pressure.
While the overall size of the elderly population
will continue to expand, the aging of the elderly
population’s age structure is also quite serious. As
shown in Figure 8, from 2015 to 2050, the base of
the elderly population pyramid will continue to
shrink, whereas its top is constantly expanding.
Specifically, the number of elders aged 80 and over
will increase significantly, from about 25 million in
2015 to more than 50 million in 2032, and from there
to over 100 million in 2048. As the advanced-ages
have more deteriorated physiological conditions,
the proportion of those who are partially or totally
disabled is higher. Hence, a larger-scale and higher
demand for medical services and a variety of longterm care services. The huge group of advancedages, exceeding 100 million by the mid-21st century,
will add to the already severe conditions the old-age
care is in.
5.2 The deepening of the population’s aging
will slow down somewhat
Compared to the original strict policy, the
universal two-child policy will give rise to a large
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Figure 8 Change Tendency of China's Elderly
Populations Pyramid(2015,2035 and 2050)

Figure 9 Change Tendency of the Elderly Population's
Proportions Under Different Childbearing Policies(2015~2050)

amount of new-born population, thereby raising
the proportion of the underage population and
relatively depressing the proportion of the elderly
population. The degree of the population’s aging
will be somewhat reduced. Forecasts (see Figure 9)
show that the elderly population’s proportion will
exceed 20% around2024, 25% around2031, 30%
around2041, and rise to about 34.0% in 2050. If
the original strict policy ismaintained unchanged,
the elderly population’s proportion will break at an
earlier time through 25% (around2030) and 30%
(around2037), and climb to about 36.6% in 2050.
The implementation of the universal two-child
policy will only make the proportion of the elderly
population by the mid-21st century 2.6 percentage
points lower than if the original strict policy remains
unchanged.
To lift control over childbearing gradually can
also somewhat ease the pressure generated by the
increasing number of advanced-ages, though the
effect will be much weaker. Under the universal twochild policy, the proportion of the senior population,
elders aged 80 and over, in the total population will
increase to about 7.9 percent by the mid-21st century.
If the original strict policy remains unchanged, the
proportion will rise to 8.5%. Even when the twochild policy for couples where either the husband

or the wife is from a single-child family and the
universal two-child policy are successively adopted,
the proportion of the senior population will only be
0.6 percentage points less by the mid-21st century
than otherwise.
5.3 The population’s aging manifests a wavelike development trend.
As the size of new entrants into the elderly
population fluctuates every year (see Figure 10),
the population's aging will take on a wave-like
development trend under different policies, or that
the aging speed will alternate between raising and
moderating. But whether it be the acceleration or
slowdown in the aging process, the absolute growth
rate of the aging under the original strict policy will
be higher than that under the universal two-child
policy.
The upcoming “13th Five-year Plan” period will
be the first period of slowdown in the rate of aging.
During this period, the late 1950s-born population
cohort will move gradually into old age. They will
no longer belong to the first birth peak, and will
be relatively small in size, which means that the
annual increase in the elderly population will be
small, the growth rate of the elderly population
will be relatively lower and the fast development
111

CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL SCIENCES

No.2

Figure 10 Change Tendency of the Number of
New Entrants into the Old Age(2015~2050)

of the aging of the advanced-ages will be eased.
If the original strict childbearing policy remains
unchanged, the aging rate at this stage will average
an annual increase of about 0.4 percentage points.
Under the universal two-child policy, the fast
development of the aging of the advanced-ages
will be eased; besides, the gradual liberalization
of the childbearing policy gives rise to more newborn population, increasing the proportion of the
underage population by a larger margin and thus
depressing the proportion of the elderly population
to an extent. Therefore, the fast progressing of the
aging of the elderly population pyramid’s base is
also restrained. The simultaneous moderating in
the aging of both the base and the top will make the
aging under the universal two-child policy rise only
0.3 percent annually.
Starting in 2021 and continuing to around2035,
the annual increase in the elderly population will
growsignificantly, as the population cohort resulting
from the second childbirth peak will gradually move
intoold age; this is the period when the aging of the
population will advance at the fastest rate. During
this period, whatever the childbearing policy, the size
of the elderly population will exceed successively
300 million and 400 million in a short period, with
its proportion surpassing respectively 20% and 25%.
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If the original strict policy remains unchanged,
the aging of the population during this period will
average an annual increase of 0.8 percentage points,
while under the universal two-child policy, the
number will be 0.7 percentage points.
Between 2036 and 2045, because the annual
increase in the elderly population will decline, the
aging of the population will enter another slowdown.
If the original strict policy remains unchanged, the
aging degree will be increased by about 0.4 percent
annually, whereas under the universal two-child
policy, the degree will be reduced by about 0.1
percent.
Beginning in 2046, the annual increase in
the elderly population will be raised substantially,
as the population cohort resulting from the third
childbirth peak move into old age. Between 2046
and 2050, the degree of aging will average an annual
growth of 0.7 percent if the original strict policy
remains unchanged, whereas the number will be
0.6 percentage points under the universal two-child
policy.
The childbearing policy adjustment and
improvement will ease the degree of population’s
aging to an extent, slow down the aging process,
but cannot fundamentally reverse the overall
aging trend. In fact, with the economic and social
development, people’s childbearing willingness will
stabilize at a relatively low level. So even if all the
restrictions on the childbearing policy are lifted,
China will not return to the era where every woman
gives birth to 5 or 6 children on average. The entire
population structure will not be young again. The
huge size of the elderly population, the rapid aging
of the elderly population and the deepening degree
of the population’s aging are all part of the future
China will have to face. Therefore, it must be keenly
noticed that the childbearing policy’s adjustment
and improvement are by no means the fundamental
solution to the population’s aging, and the effective
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way to cope with this challenge is to perfect the
social security system and improve the old-age
service system.

6. Social Support Burden: Sharply
Increased Underage Population
Expands the Overall Dependency
Burden
Dependency ratio is an index that quantifies the
per capita social support burden on the workingage population from the perspective of demographic
structure, and it is decomposed into: the child
dependency ratio (the index measuring the per capita
child nurturing burden among the working-age
population), the elderly dependency ratio (the index
measuring the average burden of providing for the
aged on the working-age population) and the total
dependency ratio (the index measuring the average
burden of child nurturing and providing for the aged
on the working-age population).
After the universal two-child policy is implemented, along with the significant increase, then
fast decline, and slight rebound in the underage
population’s size, the child dependency ratio
will correspondingly increase at first, then
decrease,thenrise again. The forecasts show that (see
Figure 11), the child dependency ratio will reach its
peak for the first half of the 21st century around the
year 2027, the peak ratio being 29.2%. After this,
the child dependency ratio will begin its continuous
decline and reach its lowest point in the first half of
the 21st century around 2039, at 24.0%. By the mid21st century, the child dependency ratio will rise to
about 28.5%. Different from the slight fluctuations
in the child dependency ratio, the elderly dependency
ratio will exhibit a strong continued rising trend. It
will exceed 30% around 2023, 40% around 2029,
50% around 2036, 60% around 2047, and rise to
66.2% by the mid-21st century. Under the double

influences of the child dependency ratio and the
elderly dependency ratio, the total dependency ratio
will be constantly uplifted, topping 60% around
2024, 70% around 2029, 80% around 2044, and
90% around 2049. By the middle of the 21st century,
it will reach near 95%.
On account of the child dependency ratio’s
variation trend differing from that of the elderly
dependency ratio throughout the first half of the
21st century, the total social support burden on the
working-age population has different compositions
during different periods. Before 2025, since the
child dependency ratio is still around its peak, and
the elderly dependency ratio has not experienced
any significant, rapid uplift, the child dependency
ratio is roughly the same as the elderly dependency
ratio. This means that during this period, the
whole society is under the double pressure of
“providing for the aged” and “children-raising”,
and the working-age population shoulder two such
burdens that are of equal amount. This requires
that the society’s infrastructure building and
public service system establishing be carried out
in a way that accommodates the needs of the two
populations. After 2025, the child dependency ratio
will experience first a decline and then a raise, the
ratio stabilizing at around 26%, whereas the elderly
dependency ratio will start to rise dramatically, and

Figure 11 Change Trend of Dependency Ratios
under the Universal Two-child Policy(2015~2050)
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exceed the child dependency ratio by a large margin
to become the lead role in the total dependency ratio.
This signifies that during this period, the burden
of “caringfor the aged” is discernibly greater than
that of “raising children” and the whole society is
faced with the “old-age service” strain, which is the
corollary of the continuous deepening of the aging
process. In order to better respond to this situation,
the infrastructure of the whole society and the public
service system must be constructed at a larger scale
and be tilted to the needs of the elderly population
more quickly.
If the original strict childbearing policy remains unchanged, there will be no releasing of the
cumulative childbearing potential and hence no
increase in the underage population’s size. Therefore,
the child dependency ratio will be in continued
slight decline, and be consistently lower than that
under the universal two-child policy. Throughout
the first half of the 21st century, the difference
between the two ratios at its maximum will be over
5 percentage points. Compared with the original
strict childbearing policy, the introduction of the
universal two-child policy will result in a larger
child-raising burden. It is, however, the opposite case
with the elderly dependency ratio. The universal
two-child policy can curb the reduction in the size
of the working-age population to an extent, and
whether the policy is adjusted, the elderly population
will hardly change through the first half of the 21st
century. For these reasons, after 2030 (before 2030,
the working-age population’s size under different
childbearing policies remains the same, and the
elderly dependency ratio remains identical), the
elderly dependency ratio under the universal twochild policy will be lower than if the original strict
policy remains unchanged. Under the original
policy, the elderly dependency ratio will exceed
70% by the mid-21st century, standing at 71.2% in
2050.Because of the positive difference between
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the child dependency ratio under the universal
two-child policy and that under the original strict
policy is greater than the absolute value of the
negative difference between the elderly dependency
ratios under the two policies, the total dependency
ratio under the universal two-child policy will be
consistently higher than that under the original strict
policy throughout the first half of the 21st century.
Although the universal two-child policy will
curbthe rapid decline in the working-age population’s
size to an extent, thereby reducing the elderly
dependency burden,the effect in this regard will
only be a limited one. Besides, the policy will bring
about a heavier child dependency burden relative
to that under the original strict policy. Hence, the
total dependency ratio under the universal two-child
policy will be greater than that if the original strict
childbearing policy is kept unchanged.

7. Conclusions
The universal two-child policy is the most
critical part in childbearing policy’s adjustment and
improvement. It makes China’s childbearing policy
fitin better with the ideal number of children among
the masses and closer to the replacement level
in the population reproduction process. Not only
does it profoundly influence the family structure,
but also dramatically changes the demographic
composition. Due to the launch of this policy, China
will face the opportunities to promote the long-term,
balanced development of population on one hand,
and be subjected to the new challenges of increased
dependency ratios and concentrated childbirths on
the otherhand. Seen from the population projection
results, the universal two-child policy’s effects are
mainly as follows:
The peak time of the total population will be
delayed and the excessive negative growth trend
will be controlled to some degree. In terms of the
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population structure, however, the bulging of the top
part of the population pyramid and the shrinking
of its base and middle parts will not be reversed,
though they will slow down. The aging of China’s
population will still be severe.
The large amount of new-born population under
the universal two-child policy will significantly
increase the size and proportion of the underage
population, changing their continuous decrease
if the original strict childbearing policy remains
unchanged, and instead, making them rise
dramatically first, then decline quickly and rebound
slightly.
As the added population born under the
universal two-child policy gradually move into
working age, the continuous decline in the workingage population’s size and proportion will be held
back. For the next 40-odd years, China’s total
working-age population will still be larger than the
working-age population in all developed countries
combined. However, before the added population
moves into working age, the population’s proportion
will decline significantly, rendering the demographic
dividend in accelerated reduction. Furthermore, in

the medium and long term, it is unrealistic to rely
on the universal two-child policy to create a new
demographic dividend, at least not until the mid-21st
century.
The universal two-child policy will not change
the size of the elderly population over the next 60
years, not to mention reverse the general trend
of a continuously expanding elderly population,
increasingly deepened aging of the population and
the growing severe aging situation. But compared
with the situation if the original strict policy remains
unchanged, the universal two-child policy will
reduce the population’s aging to some degree and
slow down its progress, though this alleviation
effect will only reduce the aging level by about 2.6
percentage points by the mid-21st century.
The universal two-child policy can slightly
reduce the elderly dependency burden, but will
bring about a heavier children dependency burden
at the same time. Therefore, on the whole, the implementation of the universal two-child policy will
aggravate the total dependency burden on society.
(English editor: Yan Yuting)

This paper has been translated and reprinted with the permission of Dong Yue Tribune, Vol.37 No.2,
2016.
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